posted 12-22-2008 06:42 PM
quote:
However, I don't think we need the word 'all' and I don't think we should tell them they failed because of the CQ's.
Examiner: “There are discernible reactions were displayed, and these issues may be targets of additional testing at a future date...”
Offender: “Does that mean I failed.”
Examiner: “It means that your having problems with some of these questions.”
Offender: “Do you mean I failed.”
Examiner: “You are reacting to some of the questions, and we may need to talk about those at your next polygraph.”
Offender: “I don't care as long as I didn't fail.”
Now, your garden-variety idiot will not be all that hard to convince, but our more dangerous offenders - the smarter, psychopathic types - will be taking careful notes.
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For the sake of argument...
The only thing that I have real concern about is the word “shall.” Do we want to bind ourselves into doing this or risk being non-compliant.
Anytime we begin to enact a policy or required procedure, we are wise to consider the potential for iatrogenic effects.
Iatrogenisis is the occurrence of unanticipated negative results or negative side effects.
What we seem to be concerned about is the potential for habituation to the CQs.
Habituation is the loss or diminishing of response potential to a stimulus. What we are trying to achieve is called dishabituation – which refers to the process of regaining a response potential that was previously habituated. Except that the next stimulus has not yet occurred, so what we are really doing is attempting to prophylactically dishabituate the examinee - to dishabituate them before they display a habituated response potential – like taking antibiotics before undergoing oral surgery, to prevent any iatrogenic effects (secondary infections).
What and how much do we really know (from studies) about how participating in a polygraph test causes the subject to habituate to the CQs. We have a lot of anecdotal and impressionistic thoughts, and some possible gaps in our hypothesizing about the broader implications of this proposal
When we tell an examinee there may be some problems with some of the questions we are trying to account for the examinee's overall experience with the polygraph, including the experience of a truthful examinees who knows he was unsure about or lied to the CQs. So, it is desirable that an examinee walks away from the polygraph feeling glad they passed, and feeling anxious about their integrity - like maybe they just barely passed. The trouble is that everyone whose client passes a polygraph doesn't "barely pass," they "pass-with-flying-colors," and all the other dramatic nonsense. (Same when people fail, they don't just "fail," like "regular fail," they "fail-miserably.” People seem to like to add drama to things.)
For a criminal suspect there polygraph experience is limited to a single test, and perhaps another test down the road some time. For a police applicant, experience with the polygraph may include exams for a couple of departments, along with the (misguided) support and encouragement at AP. For sex offenders on probation for periods of 10 years to the remainder of their lifetime (as it should be), there polygraph experience can amount to 10, 20, 30, 40 or 50 or more examinations - coupled with all of the confronting and cheerleading (punching and burping) from their therapists, supervising officers, and treatment group members.
So, imagine an offender who lies, fails, is interrogated and volunteers additional information. He'll certainly be reported as SR/DI and he'll have an opportunity to do a good job discussing the matter in more careful detail at his next individual therapy, group session, or supervision meeting.
Some of the other offenders in the group are most certain inly taking notes about what to do and what not to do. Some will notice that he made admissions after the polygraph.
Now, imagine an offender (naive subject) who passes a maintenance or monitoring polygraph, knowing that he hasn't broken the rules or reoffended (some don't actually want to go to prison), and is then told he's reacting to some of the questions on the test. We want him to leave feeling not-so-sure about himself. At his next therapy session, group meeting or supervision meeting he will certainly be asked how his polygraph went, at which point he'll indicate he is unsure because the examiner told him he was "having a problem" with some of the questions. But if the report comes back NSR he'll be relieved, at which point the group members who are taking notes will notice that he didn't make any admissions, even though he was told he has a problem with some questions - and was reported NSR.
Contrary to popular belief, offenders are not completely stupid.
Consider that group sizes are often in the area of 9 to 12 persons, who take maintenance polygraphs twice a year, plus extra tests to complete sex history exams and resolve any deceptive or inconclusive results. What this means is that offenders can be expected to be discussing someone's polygraph results during more than half of their group sessions.
It will not take many observations or experiences before word gets through the treatment group that examiners always tell everyone they are showing “discernible reactions were displayed, and these issues may be targets of additional testing at a future date.” They will also notice that anyone who makes a posttest admission is reported as SR, and those who make no admissions are not. Admissions to CQs will not be reported as SR, so those will most likely not be discussed in the treatment group, because an NSR result will signal the PO and therapist to go into cheerleader mode because the offender passed-with-flying-colors. What the offender notices is that those who make admissions most certainly fail, and those who pass seem to have made no admissions.
Offenders will also notice and inform each other that any posttest admissions will be reported to the PO and therapist. Any PO worth the weight of his rule-books will most certainly expect follow-through and consequential action in response to anything which the offender has lied about.
The reality-check for us is that we are naïve if we think we are ever going to know “everything” an offender is up to. It's simply not humanely possible to know everything. There is always more. If we keep digging, we'll keep getting more – until someone clams-up. But we still won't know everything. So, attempts to facilitate long-term stable PCSOT programs around the values-based principle of “complete disclosure” will be regarded by realistic thinkers as a values-based (read: non-evidence-based) approach that is unrealistic. For offenders, the only realistic solution to the need to report “everything” without leaving out even one single detail is to over-report – unless they think they can get it 100 percent perfect without over-reporting. The problem is that “over-reporting” is interpreted by bleeding-heart opponents of the polygraph (at ATSA) as “having to make false-admissions in order to pass the polygraph.”)
To the offender, the lesson in all of this is that the examiner will always say there are “discernible reactions were displayed, and these issues may be targets of additional testing at a future date,” and that if you make admissions you'll certainly have problems, but if you don't make admissions you have a better chance.
What we might be doing is inoculating our offenders against future posttest interrogations. We don't know. They might decide to break the rules, or even re-offend, someday They do this knowing that they will have to either lie or admit the behavior at their next polygraph. What they will also know from experience and observation is that the examiner will say there are “discernible reactions.” We will have practiced and trained them to make no admissions.
It's possible that in our effort to prophylactically dishabituate CQs responses to a future polygraph test, we are reducing the effectiveness of our posttest effort when it matters. We are naïve to assume the offenders are not assimilating information from their broader experiences and observations about the systemic processes.
We haven't really studied or considered the problem in it's larger context. I believe this is a bigger potential problem in PCSOT programs than other types of polygraph programs – because of the number of tests they take and the volume of discussion and experience that is shared with others and attached to every examination.
My real point is that anytime we start to make standards of practice or a model policy, we should base them on evidence whenever possible. It is sometimes necessary to make standard policies in the absence of evidence – when there is an imminent safety risk.
We also have to remember that each offender's experience with the polygraph is not limited to a single test. Instead there experience with the polygraph comes from dozens of testing experiences that are all processed and shared with other offenders in group, and with other professionals who sometimes do and sometimes don't understand the polygraph.
How sure are we, as masters of the human psyche, that the offenders' experiences are really what we think or hope they are?
How sure are we that offenders, after their 5th, 10th, or 20th polygraph, and after discussing polygraph groups in group therapy all year, aren't somewhat wise to polygraph schtick, and that we're not inocculating them against their next real interrogation?
So, my questions is: Is this the type of practice we'd like to see embedded in a model policy? Or, is this something that is better left as a training issue. There is a lot that we do that does not belong in a model policy.
In deciding this type of thing. We are wise to consider potential iatrogenic and systemic effects.
.02
r
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"Gentlemen, you can't fight in here. This is the war room."
--(Stanley Kubrick/Peter Sellers - Dr. Strangelove, 1964)
Polygraph Place Bulletin Board
posted 12-22-2008 10:41 AM
posted 12-26-2008 06:45 PM
